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Abstract
Virtually every legal system specifies a variety of burdens of proof for different kinds of
claims, and then secures each specification with another, nominally unrelated rule
pertaining to relitigation. In criminal law, where a prosecutor might be required to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor is prevented from repeatedly drawing
from the urn, as it were, by the familiar and nearly universal rule of double jeopardy. We
suggest that if law were to weaken the protection, or more likely to permit the defendant
to waive the double jeopardy protection, both private and social benefits might follow.
The benefits derive from the notion that with a simple double jeopardy rule, the
prosecutor – like most people who take a test knowing that there is no opportunity for
retesting – will overinvest in preparation. This starting point also illuminates relitigation,
or retesting, in other areas, far from criminal law. Thus, deficit spending by a legislature
can be understood as a product of a system in which spending proposals that are
rebuffed can be pushed forward again, while those that pass are often irreversible. Our
focus is on the idea that a prosecutor might offer defendants the option of waiving their
double jeopardy protection, in return for a reduction in prosecutorial investment in the
“first” trial and perhaps other benefits. In response, innocent defendants might be more
likely to accept the prosecutor’s offer, in which case there will be socially beneficial
sorting of criminal defendants.

